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NOTES.
THE LIABILITY IN TORT OF A CHARITABLE HOSPITAL TO ITS
PATIENTS.

Two recent cases, one in England" and the other in Pennsylvania,2 raise again the interesting question of the liability of
a charitable hospital to its patients for the negligence of its
doctors and nurses. In the former the action was brought by
a free patient for injuries received through the negligence of
a surgeon or nurse during an operation. Recovery was denied
on two grounds,--(I) that the surgeon and nurse§ (during an
operation) were not the servants of the defendant, and (2) that
the defendant's only undertaking was to use due care in the
'Hillyer v. Mayor, etc., ior L. T. 368 (igog).
'Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (not yet reported), Pa. Sup. Ct.
E. D., Jan. T. 1909, 29, 29t.
(426)
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selection of its servants and to furnish proper appliances. In
the latter a pay patient brought the action for an injury due
to the negligence of a nurse and was denied recovery on the
trust fund theory.
The subject of the financial liability of a charity in general
has now reached a stage of development where it merits comprehensive treatment, but the scope of this note will be confined to the single point of the liability of a charitable hospital
to the recipients of its bounty for injuries due to the negligence
of its doctors or nurses.
How far public policy requires the exemption of charities
from liability in tort and contract is a question on which there
is wide divergence of opinions but the authorities are practically unanimous that,.a charitable hospital should not be
liable to its patients for the negligence of its servants. Two
cases, one in Rhode Island 4 and the other in New Brunswick,5
break this line of authority, but it is interesting to note that the
next year after the Rhode Island decision was rendered it was
overthrown by statute.8 Granting, then, that public policy does
demand the exemption of a hospital from liability to its patients in such cases, upon what theory is this exemption to be
obtained?
x. Where the Injury is Due to the Negligence of One not under
the Control of the Hospital.
No difficulty arises where the action is founded on the negligence of a surgeon or other person not under the control of
the hospital, for the doctrine of respondeat superior applies
only where the relation of master and servant is established,
and this relation "exists only between persons of whom the one
has the order and control of the work done by the other."'
This was the ground of the decision of Farwell, L. J., in Hillyer v. Mayor, etc., of London,$ and is unassailable.
I Cf. "Public Charities and the Rule of Respondeat Superior," John
M. Gest, Esq., 28 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 669. "Liability of Charitable
Associations, etc." R. M. McMurtrie, E sq., 29 Am. Law Reg., N. S.
2og. "Torts of HIospitals," E. B. Callender, Esq., is Am. Law Rev.
64o. See also Central Law Journal, vol. 53, p. 62, 224 and vol. 56, p.
14
,'Glavin v. Hospital, 12 R. L 4I, (1879).
'Donaldson v. Coin missioners, 3o N. B. 27 089o).
Laws R. I. 088o) Ch. 162 § i.
'Pollock on Torts (Webb) 91.
'o
L. T: 368 (i9og).
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Where the Injury is Due to the Negligence of One under
the Control of the Hospital.

Where, however, the tort is that of a servant of the hospital,
the exemption from liability is not so easy. To attain this goal
four theories have been suggested.
a. Respondeat Superior Based on Benefit.
In some cases the exemption has been attained by holding
that the doctrine of respondeat superior is based on benefit, and
that, therefore, as charitable hospitals are not conducted for
gain, they do not fall within the reason of the rule. 9
The fundamental objection to this is that, according to what
seems the better view, the doctrine of respondeat superior is
not based on benefit. "The law is plain that whosoever undertakes the performance of, or is bound to perform, duties * * *
is liable for injuries caused by his negligent discharge of those
duties. It matters not whether he makes money or a profit
by means of discharging the duties, or whether it be a corporation or an individual that has undertaken to discharge them.
If he elects to perform the duties by employing servants, if,
in the nature of things, he is bound to perform the duties by
action in the
employing servants, he is responsible for their
10
same way that he is responsible for his own."
b. The Trust Fund Theory.
Prima facie, then, the doctrine of respondeatsuperior should
apply to a hospital though not conducted for profit, and the
trust fund theory has, therefore, been invoked to exempt such
institutions from liability. This theory holds that "a public
charity, whether incorporated or not, is but a trustee, and is
bound to apply its funds in furtherance of the charity, and not
It was upon this principle that the recent case of
otherwise."
Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (not yet reported) has just been
decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The opinion
rests mainly on two decisions,-Fire Insurance Patrol v.
Boyd,"' and Downes v. Hospital 12-- the Court failing to note
'Hearns v. Hospital, 66 Conn. 98 (z895); Farriganv. Pevear, 193

Mass. 147 (igo6).

"Gilbert v.'Tritnity House, L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 795 (x886).
"Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 12o Pa. 624, 647 (x888).
1o Mich. 555 (1894).
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that the latter decision, in so far3 as it was based on any trust
fund theory, has been overruled.'

That the trust fund theory is not sound would seem to follow from an examination of the law of trusts in general, If
the doctrine of respondeat superior is not based on benefit, an
individual trustee of an unincorporated charity would doubtless be held personally liable for the negligence of the servants
in the administration of the charity, and, upon well-known principles of trusts, he could, if personally not at fault, recover
over against the fund;"4 and in such case the injured party
could, instead of enforcing his judgment against the trustee as
the trust fund
an individual, have inmmediate recourse against
in the nature of an equitable execution.' 5 The law of trusts
would, therefore, seem to uphold the liability of the trust fund
for the negligence of the hospital's servants. Upon this line
of reasoning, apparently, the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
which had previously been committed to the trust fund theory, 16 was, in a recent action against the trustee of an unincorporated hospital, 7 forced to hold that the doctrine of respondeat supcrior is based on benefit. The trust fund theory is not
a development of the law of trusts, but had its origin in a

dictum, since repudiated, in the case of Duncan v. Findlater.13

Again, the trust fund theory seems unsound in that it permits
the mere intention of the donor (granting that such intention
exists) to %withdrawhis gift to the charity from the rules of
property, a restraint on alienation far greater than that allowed,
even in Pennsylvania, in the case of spendthrift trusts.
should
If the theory were carried to its logical conclusion it.
certainly apply to breaches of contract as well as to torts, and
to the negligence of the corporation in the selection of its servants as well as to the negligence of servants. No jurisdiction has, however, carried the doctrine to this extent. In Tennessee it has been expressly repudiated in the case of breach of
it to
contract.' 9 Some jurisdictions have expressly restricted
cases where the negligence is that of a servant,20 though in
Bruce v. Church, 147 Mich. 230 (1907).
Bennett v. Wyndhatn, 4 De. G. F. &J. 259 (1862).
"In re Raybould, (igoo) x Ch. 199. In jurisdictions where such
immediate recourse is not allowed the reason is purely proceduraL
McDonald v. Hospital,120 Mass. 432 (1876).
" Farriganv. Pevear, 193 Mass. x47 (xo6).
16 Cl. & F. 894 (839). This dictum was repudiated in Mersey
Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, z E. & 1. App. 93 (x866).
"Hall-Moody Inst. v. Copass, 1o8 Tenn. 582 (1902).
" McDonald v. Hoslital, 12o Mass. 432 (1876).
R
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others the language seems broad enough to cover all actions
of tort.21 In Pennsylvania the doctrine is not applied where
the negligence is incident to a business collateral to the charitable object of the trust,22 and the charity is liable for a municipal assessment for the cost of curbing, paving, etc., though
such is held to be "a liability incurred ' 23for neglect of a duty
imposed by the police power of the city.
Finally, the trend of authority to-day is away from the trust
fund theory as a ground of the exemption of charitable hospitals from liability for the negligence of their servants. In
England, to be sure, the case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital
v. Ross 2 4 has never been expressly overruled, but, as it was

based on the dictum in Duncan v. Findlater,25 overruled in
Mcrsey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs,26 and as no mention of it was
made in the recent case of Hillyer v. Mayor, Ctc.,2 T it must be
considered as no longer an authority, and it may be safely said
that the trust fund theory on which it was based has been repudiated in England. The Federal 2 and New York 2 9 courts have
refused to apply this doctrine. It has been criticised in New
Hampshire,"0 is not followed in Connecticut,3 1 has been repudiated in Michigan, 32 and has never been followed in Rhode
Island 33 or New Brunswick," and even the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which early adopted it, showed a tendency when
the question was last brought before it 35 to find other grounds
of exemption. On the other hand, an examination of the cases
in the few jurisdictions which still adhere to the trust fund
theory will show that most of them can be explained on more
satisfactory grounds.
I Parks v. N. W. University, 218 Ill. 381 (i9o) ; Abston v. Waldon
Academy, 118 Tenn. 24 (i9o6); Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 2o

(1884).
" Winnemore v. Phila., 18 Pa. Super. 625 (igoz).
"Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 143 Pa. 367 (i89i).
3412 C1. & F. 5o7 (1846).
6 CL & F. 894 (1839).

z E. & I. App. 93 (i866).
L. T. 368 (xgog).
' Powers v. Hospital,
iog Fed. 294 (19o).

21?Toi

" Kellogg Church Foundation, 112 N. Y. S. 566 (App. Div.)

(igo8).

"He'wt v. Associatiotf, 73 N. H. 556 (i906).
.Hearns v. Hospital, 66 Conn. 98 (1895).
"Bruce v. Church, 147 Mich. 23o (iO7).
u*Glavin v. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411 (1879).
"Donaldson v. Commissioners, 3o N. B. 279 (89o).
'Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147 (io6).

NOTES

c. Assumption of Risk.
During the last few years the non-liability of a charitable
hospital to its patients has been explained upon the theory that
the beneficiaries, including pay as well as free patients, assume
the risk of any injury incurred through the negligence of the
hospital's servants if due care has been used in their selection.
This doctrine is followed in the Federal,3" Michigan,"7 and New9
York 38 courts and has been at least suggested in England.
It seems in the main to be a satisfactory ground of decision.

d. Limited Undertaking.
Another doctrine, which is at least plausible, was the basis of
the opinion of Kennedy, L. J., in the recent case of Hillyer v.
Mayor, ctc.40 Under it the exemption of a hospital from liability for the negligence of its servants is based on the theory
that a hospital undertakes merely to use due care in the selection of its servants and to furnish proper appliances.
Under either of the last two theories the patient could, of
course, recover if he could establish a contract which the hospital had broken."
Institutions of public charity are daily becoming more numerous, and the problems connected with their liability are, therefore, of increasing importance. How far public policy will in
the future demand their exemption from liability is of course
problematical, but the development of the law indicates that
the required exemption will at no distant date be placed upon
firmer and more satisfactory foundations than any trust fund
H.E.
theory can supply.

RIGHT OF SURETY TO ExoNERATIoN.

The right of the surety to maintain a bill in equity against
the principal debtor after the obligation becomes payable, and
exonerate himself from further liability, has been recognized
"Powers v. Hospital, io9 Fed. 294 (igoi).

"Bruce v. Church, 47 Mich. 23o (xio7).
'Kellogg Church Foundation, 112 N. Y. S. 566 (App. Div.)
(19o8).
" Tozeland v. Guardians,L. R. (79o7) x K. B.

Law Reg. N. S. x24.
io L. T. 368 (9og),
Ward v. Hospital, 79 N. Y. S. io4 (App. Div.)

920.

See 47 Am.

(i9o3).
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from early times; and this is true, notwithstanding the surety
has not paid the debt, and whether he has been sued by the
creditor or not. This is in the nature of a bill quia timet to
compel the principal debtor to pay the debt and perform the
obligation, provided the creditor can enforce payment or performance, but neglects or refuses to do so. The creditor must,
however, be joined as co-defendant.
This principle is illustrated by a recent case, Ascherson v.
Tredegar Dry Dock and Wharf Co., Ltd.' The plaintiff's intestate had become surety for a limited amount against the
defendant's overdrafts, for a period of time determinable upon
notice. Upon the death of the surety, his executor, the present
plaintiff, desiring to wind up the estate, requested tbc defendants to discharge him from liability upon an overdraft of
172191., and upon their refusal, brought this suit. Plaintiff
claimed the right to be discharged and exonerated from all
liability under the guarantee, by compelling the defendants to
pay the bank the amount of the overdraft. It was contended
that until the guarantee had been determined, and the overdraft
called in, no right of action accrued to the bank against the
surety,; but the Court was of opinion that this was unsound.
Repayment Of the overdraft could be enforced by the bank
at any time, as the contract did not compel the bank to allow
overdrafts. Since, therefore, the bank has a present right of
action against the surety, the latter may come into equity to
compel the principal debtor to pay what is due from him, to
the intent that the surety may be relieved, and it was so decreed.
To the same effect is the case of Holcomb v. Fetter 2 where
payment was decreed by the principal debtor, at the instance
of the surety, notwithstanding that it did not appear that the
principal debtor was insolvent or in danger of becoming so;
the Court holding that the jurisdiction does not rest upon this
ground. It was further argued that if the creditor should
sleep upon his rights and'fail to bring action, such laches would
be a good defense to an action against the surety for contribution. But the creditor is not barred by laches alone; and further, the cases rest upon the principle that there is a debt due
which it is the duty of the principal debtor, in exoneration of
his surety, to pay forthwith. The bill is one of quia timet. The
plaintiff has a present right to exoneration because the debt
is due.a
'Ct. of App. z9og, L. It. 2 CI. 401.
'67 AtL Rep. 1o78 (N. J.).
'See also Frick v. Black, x7 N. J. Eq. i89; West v. Chasten, 12 Fla.
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At law, the surety must pay the debt before he can have an
action against his principal ; and grave doubts were for a long
time entertained as to the right of the surety to call upon the
creditor to prosecute his demand against the principal debtor.
It was deemed an interference with the legal rights of the creditor, for he may have looked more to the surety than to the
actual debtor, resting content under the doctrine that it is the
surety's business to see whether the principal pays, and not
that of the creditor. Consequently, the surety could impose no
burden upon the creditor by notifying him to proceed against
the principal, and this was the rule in most jurisdictions at
the common law.
In most States by statute, however, the surety may require
the creditor by written notice to bring suit against the principal; and upon the creditor's refusal or failure to comply with
zuch notice, the surety is released, unless the principal was
insolvent at the time notice was given, or becomes insolvent
be fore the creditor can collect by process ;5 and the burden is on
the creditors to show that action would have been unavailing.
But independently of statute, the surety might get a decree
in chancery that the creditor sue or take out execution against
the principal for good cause shown; it being unreasonable that
a man should have such a cloud always hanging over him; but
this action is limited, generally, to cases where it works no
hardship upon the creditor, and would work a hardship upon
the surety if the creditor were to proceed directly against the
surety. 6
In Pennsylvania, however, ,otice has been substituted for
the decrec in chancery; but the notice must be as explicit as
a decree that the creditor sue or execute the principal;f and
where the surety had notified the plaintiff to proceed and "collect his money, as he would be bail no longer," and later extended the time to a specified day, and the creditor did not
issue process, and the principal debtor, six days after the expiration of the extended time, assigned all his property for the
benefit of creditors, the surety was not discharged, because
there was not that explicit direction to proceed that the law
315; Graham v. Thornton, 9

South (Miss.) 292 (1891) ;Stump v. Rogers,

i Ohio 533; Bishop v. Day, 13 Vt. 81; Dobio v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
95 Wis. 54o; Craigheadv. Swart., 219 Pa. i49.
'Bishop v. Day, 13 Vt. 81.
"85 Ill. 22; 9 Ind. 245; 6 Iowa, 538; 76 Mo. 70.
'Marsh v. Pike, 1o Paige. 595 (N. Y.); Dobio v. Fidelity Co., 95
Wis. c4o; City of Keokuk v. Love, 3z Ia. 1ig.
' Cope v. Sinith, 8 S. & R. i5; Greena walt v. Krcider, 3 Barr. 267.
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required in order to relieve him from liability; nor will a
mere notice by the surety to the creditor that he would no
longer consider himself bound, and requesting him to take
another bond or payment, absolve the surety 8
G.H.B.
CARRIERS-CAR

DISTRIBUTION-COMPANy

FUEL CARS.

As a common carrier, a railroad is required to furnish all
facilities necessary for transportation, including cars, a supply
of which must be afforded sufficient to accommodate the traffic
offered. It is not incumbent, however, upon a railroad to furnish sufficient specialized cars to meet the demahid therefor
at all times. Such cars must necessarily remain idle except
when required by the traffic to which they are particularly
adapted, and for that reason a railroad is held to have discharged its obligation by furnishing enough of such cars to
meet the average demand." Coal cars are suited only to the
transportation of coal, and are, therefore, within this nile.
As the output of bituminous coal fluctuates in a marked degree,
as a result of the varying demand for that commodity, and
as the lack of storage facilities at the mine makes it imperative
that the coal be taken by the carrier at the mouth of the mine,
it follows that at certain periods it is impossible for the carrier
to supply all shippers with a sufficient number of cars to enable them to meet the market demand for coal. In such periods
it is the duty of the carrier to pro-rate the available cars
among all shippers in a particular district, so that 2none will be
put at a disadvantage as regards his competitors.
In order to arrive at a fair and just distribution of available
cars, it is necessary, first, that the capacity of each mine in the
district under consideration be ascertained, and, second, th.1t
an equitable scheme for the allotment of cars in shortage periods, in proportion to the capacities of the mines, be fixed upon.
The question of determining the capacity of a mine is not
strictly a judicial one, and it is not within the scope of the
present note to discuss the various schemes for ascertaining
capacity that have been passed upon by the courts. Suffice it to
give the following statement by Judge Goff of the factors that
•Greenawalt v. Kreider, 3 Barr. 264.

'U. S. ex rel. Pitcairis Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 165 Fcd.

113,

(reversed on a question of jurisdiction by the United States
Supreme Court, Jan. 1o, 1g1o).
1 § 3, Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by Act of June 29,
;o6,
4 Statutes at Large, 584.
119,

NOTES

must be considered. "The capacity of a coal mine for rating
purposes is the amount of coal it is able to place in the railroad
cars in a givcn time, and that depends on its working places,
the thick iess of its coal seams, its switches, workmen, mine
cars and tipples, its general equipment and its management."s
It is the method of distribution of cars after the capacities
of the various mines have been ascertained, that gives rise to
difficulties. There are four classes of cars that must be included in making distribution; system cars, those belonging
to the railroad and devoted to general use; private cars, those
belonging to mine operators; foreign railway fuel cars, those
belonging to a connecting carrier, assigned by it to particular
mines for the purpose of obtaining fuel coal; company fuel
cars, those belonging to the carrier touching the mines in
question, and assigned by it to particular mines for fuel coal.
System cars are affected by no consideration varying the
general rule. and must, of course, be apportioned ratably according to the respective capacities of the mines.
Private cars have afforded some difficulty in the past, but it
is now settled that they must be counted against the percentage
of system cars to which any mine is entitled in shortage penods, 4 but a mine is entitled to all the cars that it owns although
they exceed the number of system cars to which it would be
entitled in the absence of such ownership.5 The ground for this
rule is that, as it is the duty of the railroad, and not of the
shipper, to furnish cars. all cars in use must be considered as
belonging to the railroad, no matter how obtained by it.6 This
rule is justified by the consideration that private cars constitute a tax upon the transportation facilities of the carrier, to
only a ratable share of which the owner of private cars is

'U. S. cx rel. Kingwood Coal Co. v. W. Va. N. R. Co.

252, 256.

125

Fed.

"R. P. Com. of Ohio v. H. V. R. Co., 12 Interst. Com. Rep. 398. 411;
Rail & River Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. Rep. 86, 9g;
IT. S. 'x rel. CoiTman Y. '. & WV. Ry. Co.. IV) Fed. 831, 837; Loyan
Coal Co. v. P. R. Co. T54 Fed. 497, 503; U. S. ex rel. Pitcarn Coal
Co. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 165 Fed 113, 126. (reversed on a question

of jurisdiction by United States Supreme Court on Jan. io, 191o);
Tracr r. Chi. & Alt. R. Co., 13 Interst. Com. Rep. 451, 458.
'P. R. Corn. of Ohio v. H. V. R. Co., 12 Interst. Com. Rep. 398. 411;
Rail & Ri'er Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co. 14 I. C. C. Rep. 86, 92;
Tracr v. Chli. & Alt. R Co., 13 Interst. Com. Rep. 45r, 458.
'Shanberg v. D.. L & TV. R. Co., 4 I. C. C. Rep. 63o, 66o; Rice
v. I!. .Y. '. & P. R. Co.. 4 T. C. C. Rep. 131, 149; Refiner'$, Asso-

ciation v. TV. M. Y. & P. R. Co. 5 I. C. C. Rep. 415. 434; It re Transportation of Fruit, IT Interst. Com. Rep.

129, 137.
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entitled.' With this proposition in view it is difficult logically
to justify the latter part of the rule, giving a mine operator
the use of all his private cars at all events; but as a practical
proposition, its fairness seems unquestionable.
The same rule has finally been settled upon with regard to
foreign railway fuel cars. Those consigned to a particular
mine must be counted against its percentage, but it is entitled
to all cars so consigned though they exceed its percentage,$
and this rule has been adhered to in the face of objections by
the company assigning the cars.
Company fuel cars also are governed by the same rule of distribution,9 but a stubborn fight was made against it by both the
shippers and the railroads, and the question was finally settled
only by an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.10 The
argument against counting domestic fuel cars, which prevailed
in the Circuit Court, is as follows: "Commerce in this instance
(company fuel cars) ends at the tipples. From there on
* * * there is no consignor, no consignee, no shipper, no
common carrier, no freight, no vehicle transporting a commodity in commerce. * * * It is erroneous, therefore, to require complainants, in distributing their available commercial
equipment among their shipping patrons, to take account of
cars that are used in handling their own fuel."11
On appeal, the Supreme Court, reversing the Circuit Court
and affirming the Commission, held that in reviewing a decision
of the Commission only three questions were open for consideration, (i) relevant questions of constitutional power and
right, (2) whether the scope of the delegated power had been
'exceeded in form, (3) whether the scope of such authority had
been exceeded in substance. It then held that the question of
taking account of company fuel cars for purposes of distribution was within the jurisdiction of the Commission, as conS'Logan Coal Co. v. P. R. Co., i54 Fed. 497, 503, Rail & River Coal
Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co., x4 S. C C. Rep. 86, 92.
'R.R. Con. of 0. v. H. V. R. Co., 12 Interst. Com. Rep. 398. 405;
Traer v. Chi. & Alt. R. Co., 13 Tnterst. Com. Rep. 451, 458; Rail &
River Coal Co. v. B. & 0. 'R. Co., 14 I. C. C, Rep. 86, 91; Logan
Coal Co. v. P. R. Co. x54 Fed 497, 503; U. S. ex rel. Pitcairn Coal
Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 165 Fed. T13, 126, (reversed on a question of
jurisdiction by United States Supreme Court, Jan. io, 19ro).
'Traer v. Chi. & Alton R. Co., 13 Interst. Com. Rep. 45!. 458;
Logan Coal Co. v. P. R. Co., 154 Fed. 497, 503; U. S. ex tel. Pitcairn
Coal Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 165 Fed. M3, z26 (reversed on a question of jurisdiction by United States Supreme Court, (Jan. io, i9io).
"I. C. C. v. Ill. Cert. R. Co.. 215 U. S.. (Jan. io, gio).
" Chi. & Alt. R. Co. v. -L C. C., 173 Fed. 930. 933.
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merce excludes all transportation whether commercial or not,
and all equipment used therein. After disposing of a question
of the power of the Commission arising in connection with the
construction of section 4 of the act, the Court then takes up
a number of logical objections to the rule laid down by it and
dismisses them with the remark that they merely suggest the
complexity of the subject, and go only to the expediency of the
Commission's order.
The whole attitude of the Court seems to be that it will not
disturb a decision of the commission on questions within its
jurisdiction and powers, as such questions are influenced by
practical economic considerations, that should properly be left
to the discretion of the commission as a body of experts. The
indication is, therefore, that all the rules laid down by the
Commission concerning the distribution of cars will be affirmed
if taken to the United StatesSupreme Court.
E. S.B.

